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Expanding the Scope of Practice for Advanced Practice Registered Nurses: A 
Legislative Call to Action 
By A.J. Barbarito* 
Part I: Introduction 
Advanced Practice Registered Nurses (APRNs) are skilled clinicians, whose expertise 
could aid immensely in the expansion and affordability of health care in the United States. 
Unfortunately, their practice is often hobbled by cumbersome collaborative agreements with 
physicians. A 2011 Institute of Medicine (IOM) report on the future of nursing recommended inter 
alia that "[n]urses should practice to the full extent of their education and training."1 This would 
entail uncoupling APRNs from physician oversight of their practice, as current regulation in most 
states mandates that APRNs must operate to some extent in collaboration with, and accountable 
to, a supervising physician. 
 While many states currently have legislation in place—or pending—granting APRNs the 
right to practice to the extent of their training, the expansion of APRN roles in the care of patients 
is not without controversy.2 The IOM report received backlash from physician groups, including 
the American Medical Association, who urged that such expansion would not improve quality of 
care, ostensibly because nurses do not receive the level of training that physicians receive.3 
However, such concerns are almost entirely unsupported by empirical studies. Moreover, this 
                                                 
* JD Candidate, Seton Hall University School of Law, Class of 2016. I would like to thank especially Dean Kathleen 
Boozang, for all of her help and her enduring patience. I would also like to thank Prof. Marina Lao, 
Assemblywoman Nancy Munoz, and Winifred Quinn for their time and contributions. 
1 NST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF NURSING: LEADING CHANGE, ADVANCING HEALTH S-4 (2011) [hereinafter IOM 
FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT], available at 
http://www.thefutureofnursing.org/sites/default/files/Future%20of%20Nursing%20Report_0.pdf. 
2 NAT’L ASSOC. OF CLINICAL NURSE SPECIALISTS, SCOPE OF PRACTICE FAQS FOR CONSUMERS 2-3 
http://www.nacns.org/docs/toolkit/3A-FAQScope.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2015). 
3 Press Release, American Medical Assoc., AMA Responds to IOM Report on Future of Nursing (Oct. 5, 2010) 
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/news/news/nursing-future-workforce.page. 
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interference from physicians, in the face of ample evidence that APRNs supply care that is at least 
favorably comparable to that of physicians, calls into question whether physicians have patients’ 
best interests in mind, or whether their attitudes and actions are in fact anti-competitive. The 
question then becomes whether physicians’ opposition puts them at risk of antitrust liability.  
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part II introduces the reader to APRNs, including their 
training, education and practice, and the data available on their competency as healthcare 
practitioners. It also discusses the clinician shortages and expanded Medicaid and insurance 
coverage that leads to the necessity of expanded access to health care. 
Part III discusses the current legislative scheme that regulates the scope of practice for 
APRNs. It then explores the Institute of Medicine’s report, and efforts from various agencies 
advocating the expanded scope of practice for APRNs. This Note calls upon current legislatures, 
especially New Jersey’s, to amend laws governing the practice of nursing to expand their scope of 
practice. 
Part IV discusses physician opposition to this legislative action, and opines that this is 
motivated by anticompetitive rather than patient care concerns; this section suggests possible 
remedies, concluding with the proposition that while antitrust actions may provide some limited 
remedies for isolated cases of blatant anti-competitive behavior, the issue must ultimately be 
resolved by state legislatures.4 
Part II: APRN Background and Regulation 
A: Introduction to APRN 
                                                 
4 This Note does not argue or advocate for expanded scope of practice for any professions aside from that of 
APRNs. While I acknowledge that certain other practitioners, including chiropractors, naturopaths, and various 
others argue for expanded scope of practice rights, these professions are starkly distinct from APRNs, and their 
arguments for expanded scope of practice are not meant to be supported by the research found in this Note, nor does 
this Note recognize such as “medical” practitioners.  
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 “APRN” is a specific category of nursing professional as defined by most state practice 
laws.5 An APRN is a medical professional with an advanced nursing (post-graduate) degree in one 
of four specialties: certified registered nurse anesthetist (CRNA), certified nurse-midwife (CNM), 
clinical nurse specialist (CNS), and certified nurse practitioner (CNP).6 Each of these healthcare 
practitioner categories specialize in the care of at least one population, including family/individual 
across the lifespan, adult-gerontology, pediatrics, neonatal, women’s health/gender-related, or 
psych/mental health.7 There has been some discussion regarding whether APRNs should complete 
a residency program for clinical training, and there currently exist several such programs 
throughout the US.8 Many institutions conferring APRN degrees carry a credit load which, in other 
health care degree programs, would be equivalent to a doctoral degree.9  
Each APRN specialist is trained in a specific area of health care. The CRNA is trained to 
provide anesthesia for a diverse spectrum of patients in diverse locations.10 He or she will 
administer anesthesia to both healthy and severely ill patients, for a wide variety of procedures, in 
settings that include “hospital surgical suites and obstetrical delivery rooms; critical access 
                                                 
5 Daniel J. Gilman & Julie Fairman, Antitrust and the Future of Nursing: Federal Competition Policy and the Scope 
of Practice, 24 HEALTH MATRIX 143, 145 (2014). 
6 APRN Consensus Work Grp., Consensus Model for APRN Regulation: Licensure, Accreditation, Certification & 
Education 5 (Nat'l Council of State Boards of Nursing 2008) [hereinafter NCSBN CONSENSUS MODEL], 
https://www.ncsbn.org/Consensus_Model_for_APRN_Regulation_July_2008.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2015). 
7 Id., at 6. 
8 Kate Darby Rauch, Are Residencies the Future of Nurse Practitioner Training?, SCIENCE OF CARING (Jan., 2013), 
http://scienceofcaring.ucsf.edu/future-nursing/are-residencies-future-nurse-practitioner-
training#sthash.mROjZli6.dpuf. 
9 Am. of Colleges of Nursing, The Doctor of Nursing Practice (2013), http://www.aacn.nche.edu/media-
relations/fact-sheets/DNPFactSheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2015); The subjects of whether the Doctor of Nursing 
Practice (DNP) degree should be a prerequisite to APRN status, and the AMA’s “Truth in Advertising” campaign 
focusing on allegedly misleading applications of the DNP degree are not addressed in this Note. 
10 See NCSBN CONSENSUS MODEL, supra note 6, at 8. 
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hospitals; acute care; pain management centers; ambulatory surgical centers; and the offices of 
dentists, podiatrists, ophthalmologists, and plastic surgeons.”11 
The CNM provides a wide variety of care to women, “including gynecologic care, family 
planning services, preconception care, prenatal and postpartum care, childbirth, and care of the 
newborn.”12 Their patients occasionally include the male partners of their female patients, for 
treatment of sexually transmitted diseases and reproductive health.13 The CNM practices in many 
settings, including “home, hospital, birth center, and a variety of ambulatory care settings including 
private offices and community and public health clinics.”14 
The CNS “is responsible and accountable for diagnosis and treatment of health/illness 
states, disease management, health promotion, and prevention of illness and risk behaviors among 
individuals, families, groups, and communities,” integrating care between and among the three 
spheres of influence: patient, nurse, and system.15 His or her primary goal is to improve patient 
outcomes and the quality of nursing care, and while the CNS has traditionally worked in hospitals, 
the role is expanding into nursing homes, schools, home care, and hospice.16 The CNS role has 
historically experienced ambiguity, such that they have assumed many roles, including “staff and 
patient educator, consultant, supervisor, project director, and more recently, case manager.”17 The 
CNS concept was developed in World War II, when the need emerged to have highly qualified 
nurses involved in patient care.18 
                                                 
11 Id.; see also American Assoc. of Nurse Anesthetists, Qualifications and Capabilities of the Certified Registered 
Nurse Anesthetist, http://www.aana.com/ceandeducation/becomeacrna/Pages/Qualifications-and-Capabilities-of-the-
Certified-Registered-Nurse-Anesthetist-.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2015). 
12 See NCSBN CONSENSUS MODEL, supra note 6, at 8. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id., at 8-9. 
16 Id. 
17 Michalene Jansen et al., Advanced Practice Nursing 21 (3rd ed. Springer Publ'g 2009). 
18 Id., at 20. 
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NPs are perhaps the most recognizable of the four APRN roles, and they are especially 
ubiquitous in their areas of specialty. NPs “diagnose; develop differential diagnoses; order, 
conduct, supervise, and interpret diagnostic and laboratory tests; and prescribe pharmacologic and 
nonpharmacologic treatments in the direct management of acute and chronic illness and disease,” 
and they perform all of these roles across virtually every medical specialty and subspecialty.19 NPs 
may practice autonomously or in collaboration with other healthcare professionals.20  
B: APRN Training 
Regarding the sufficiency of APRN education and training, the American Association of 
Nurse Practitioners (AANP) highlights the fact that nursing students start their formal healthcare 
education before entering graduate school (as opposed to physicians, who begin such training in 
medical school), and this training includes “physical assessment skills, interpreting diagnostic test 
results, [and] evaluating the appropriateness of medications and patients’ responses to treatments 
in both hospital and community settings.”21 The AANP observes further that nursing education is 
based upon competency, rather than time, and quotes a physician from the American Academy of 
Family Physicians (AAFP)—an organization that actively opposes scope of practice 
reformation—criticizing the current method in medical education of using time, rather than 
competency, as the yardstick for measuring successful education.22 
                                                 
19 Id., at 16; What’s an NP?, AM. ASSOC. OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS (Mar. 15, 2015), http://www.aanp.org/all-about-
nps/what-is-an-np. 
20 What’s an NP?, AM. ASSOC. OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS (Mar. 15, 2015), http://www.aanp.org/all-about-nps/what-
is-an-np. 
21 Clinical Outcomes: The Yardstick of Educational Effectiveness, AM. ASSOC. OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS (Mar. 15, 
2015), http://www.aanp.org/images/documents/publications/clinicaloutcomesyardstick.pdf.  
22 Id., (“Both in medical student education and residency, we have clung to the belief that if you spend a certain 
amount of time learning about something, then you must know it,” he told AAFP News Now. “That’s as ridiculous 
as thinking that a teenager should be given a (driver’s) license just because he or she spent a set number of hours 
behind the wheel of a car”); see also Anna-Lena Nieminen, Bodil Mannevaara & Lisbeth Fagerström, Advanced 
Practice Nurses' Scope of Practice: A Qualitative Study of Advanced Clinical Competencies, 25 Scandinavian J. of 
Caring Sci. 662, 661-670 (2011) (many researchers relate RNs’ clinical competence to the nurse-patient relationship 
while relating the quality of nursing care to a population’s health needs []. The description of clinical competence 
varies from tasks to be done to a holistic view that includes knowledge, skills, ability, and ethical conduct []. Several 
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C: APRN Regulation 
In many states, APRNs are restricted by local regulatory schemes that prevent them from 
practicing to the full extent of their education. Specifically, “Scope of Practice”, a term used with 
all licensed health practitioners, describes “the rules, the regulations, and the boundaries within 
which a fully qualified practitioner with substantial and appropriate training, knowledge, and 
experience may practice in a field of medicine or surgery, or other specifically defined field.”23 
Under the current regulatory scheme of most states, even though APRNs receive training that 
qualifies them to practice in areas beyond these limits, they are either entirely denied the right to 
do so, or must work under restrictive collaborative agreements, wherein they ostensibly are 
supervised by a physician.24 As will be demonstrated in this Note, these regulatory schemes have 
nothing to do with empirical evidence regarding patient outcomes, competency, or malpractice 
concerns; rather, they are simply an outgrowth of unsubstantiated and misleading claims by 
physicians’ groups that the traditional patriarchal system of physician-led healthcare teams must 
be preserved. 
 
1- Expanding Scope of Practice - Access 
                                                 
researchers emphasize that both practical and theoretical knowledge are part of professional clinical competence []. 
Clinical competence is based on a nurse’s ability to integrate nursing science and other sciences into his/her clinical 
competence []. The practical knowledge in clinical nursing care is also formed through role models []. An RN’s 
clinical competence consists of his/her personal ability and capability in implementing knowledge in different 
nursing contexts and situations in cooperation with others). 
 
23 FED'N OF STATE MED. BOARDS, ASSESSING SCOPE OF PRACTICE IN HEALTH CARE DELIVERY: CRITICAL 
QUESTIONS IN ASSURING PUBLIC ACCESS AND SAFETY (2005), 
http://library.fsmb.org/pdf/2005_grpol_scope_of_practice.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2015). 
24 AM. ACAD. OF FAMILY PHYSICIANS, GUIDELINES ON THE SUPERVISION OF CERTIFIED NURSE MIDWIVES, NURSE 
PRACTITIONERS AND PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS (2008), 
http://www.aafp.org/dam/AAFP/documents/news/NP_Info_GlinesNP-060710.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2015); 
Joanne Pohl et al., The Latest Data On Primary Care Nurse Practitioners And Physicians: Can We Afford To Waste 
Our Workforce?, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Jun. 18 2013) (“More than half the states require physician supervision or 
collaboration for an NP to practice, despite the lack of any data to support the need for such a regulation”).  
8 
 
The current impetus for APRN scope of practice expansion is the gap in access to quality 
medical care, especially primary care. The number of physicians entering into primary care or 
internal medicine is steadily decreasing, while the number of nurse practitioners (NPs) is 
increasing.25 The AMA has cited experts predicting a shortage of more than 45,000 primary care 
physicians by 2020.26  This shortage is attributed to several factors, including increased demand 
for healthcare brought on by the aging of the “baby boomer” generation as well as the influx of 
newly insured Affordable Care Act beneficiaries, and decreased supply, resulting from a large 
class of primary care physicians retiring (also baby boomers), and decreased interest from medical 
students in primary care, largely due to its low reimbursement rates.27 While there is disagreement 
over the extent of the shortage, experts agree that poor urban and rural areas are most affected.28 
APRNs, if un-tethered from supervising physicians, would be able to expand into rural areas that 
physicians eschew.29 Currently, 18% of NPs practice in such rural areas, while CNMs attend a 
“substantial portion of births” and CRNAs are the sole anesthesia providers in 85% of those rural 
areas.30 This is possible because in many of these rural states, scope of practice for APRNs has 
already been expanded to allow either a more liberal collaborative agreement, or have altogether 
disbursed with collaborative agreements, allowing full scope of practice.31  
                                                 
25 Mary D. Naylor & Ellen T. Kurtzman, The Role of Nurse Practitioners in Reinventing Primary Care, 24 Health 
Aff. 893, 893-894 (2010). 
26 Press Release, American Medical Assoc., AMA Urges Continued Support for Adequate Graduate Medical 
Education Funding to Meet Future Physician Workforce Needs (July 29, 2014) available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/news/news/2014/2014-07-29-support-graduate-medical-education-funding.page. 
27 Mark D. Schwartz, Health Care Reform and the Primary Care Workforce Bottleneck, 27 J. of Gen. Internal 
Med. 469, 469-472 (2012); Stephen C. Schimpff, Why is there a shortage of primary care physicians?, 
KEVINMD.COM (Feb. 17, 2014) http://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2014/02/shortage-primary-care-physicians.html.  
28 The Editorial Bd., Bottlenecks in Training Doctors, N.Y. Times, July 19, 2014 at , 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/20/opinion/sunday/bottlenecks-in-training-doctors.html?_r=1 (last visited Mar. 
16, 2015). 
29 Sylvia Smith, Nurse Practitioners Fill the Gap, AARP THE MAGAZINE, AARP.ORG, (AUG.-SEPT., 2014), 
http://www.aarp.org/health/healthy-living/info-2014/nurse-practitioners-fill-the-gap.html. 
30  Kelly A. Goudreau et al., Health Policy and Advanced Practice Nursing 33 (Springer Publ'g 2013). 
31 See discussion, Part III, infra. 
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2 – Economic Benefits 
The other impetus for legislation is the possible economic benefits of expanded scope, 
though even the IOM report concedes that an analysis of those benefits is problematic.32 However, 
one study in 2009 projected that Massachusetts (which at the time was the only state to have passed 
sweeping health care legislation) could save $4.2 to $8.4 billion on health care between 2010-2020 
by expanding scope of practice for NPs.33 That study further proposed that encouraging use of 
CNMs for low-risk pregnancies and CRNAs for certain surgeries could similarly reduce costs.34 
Linked to this finding is the proposal, in the same report, that promotion of “retail clinics”; i.e., 
clinics found in retail shopping centers and drug stores, could save the State $6 billion between 
2010-2020.35 The link stems from the fact that generally, NPs are the ones who staff such clinics, 
and they would need full prescriptive abilities to convey the benefits.36 It should be noted, however, 
that the economic motive is secondary to the overall goal of promoting access to and quality of 
care, and since part of the agenda for APRNs is to achieve parity of reimbursement with physicians 
for equal service, the economic benefit could ultimately prove negligible.37 
 
 
Part III: Legislating Scope of Practice Barriers 
A: Federal Legislation 
                                                 
32 IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra at 1-8. 
33 Christine E. Eibner et al, Controlling Health Care Spending in Massachusetts: An Analysis of Options,103-104 
(Rand 2009). 
34 Id., at 108. 
35 Id., at 87. 
36 Id., at 85. 
37 Patricia L. Starck, The Cost of Doing Business in Nursing Education, 21 J. of Prof. Nursing 183, 185 (2005); IOM 
FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT at S-8. 
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The IOM report makes separate recommendations for federal and state legislative action. 
Regarding federal action, it recommends: (1) Expanding Medicare to cover APRN services 
currently allowed under state law, as PCPs are covered, and at the same rates; (2) Amending 
Medicare to authorize certain APRN admitting privileges and certifications; (3) Extending the 
ACA Medicaid reimbursement increases for primary care physicians to cover APRN services; (4) 
Limiting federal funding for nursing programs only to states that have adopted the National 
Council of State Boards of Nursing (NCSBN) advanced practice registered nurse model rules and 
regulations.38 
1: Expanding Medicare 
Current Medicare Conditions of Participation enable CRNAs and CNMs to perform 
services without a collaboration agreement with physicians in order to be reimbursed, though 
neither will necessarily receive reimbursement equal to that of a physician performing the same 
procedure.39 By contrast the Conditions of Participation require that an NP or a CNS must work in 
collaboration with a physician, despite the existence of a more permissive state scope of practice 
scheme.40 Medicare reimburses the NP or CNS up to 85% of what a physician would earn for the 
same service.41 The committee advising Congress on the matter has not provided an analytical 
justification for the difference in reimbursement rates.42 Since insurance companies take their cues 
                                                 
38 Id.; APRN Joint Dialogue Group Report, July 7, 2008 at 7; Robert Pear, As Medicaid Rolls Swell, Cuts in 
Payments to Doctors Threaten Access to Care, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/28/us/obamacare-medicaid-fee-increases-expiring.html?_r=2 (last visited Mar. 17, 
2015)(the increased reimbursement expired on December 31, 2014). 
39 DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES CTRS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE INFORMATION 
FOR ADVANCED PRACTICE REGISTERED NURSES, ANESTHESIOLOGIST ASSISTANTS, AND PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS 
(2011). 
40 At-a-Glance Billing Guidelines, TEX. MED. ASS’N., http://www.texmed.org/Template.aspx?id=2273 (last visited 
Mar. 17, 2015). 
41 Id. 
42 Amanda Cassidy, Nurse Practitioners and Primary Care, HEALTH AFF., Oct. 25, 2012, 
http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=79. (“The Medicare Payment Advisory 
Commission, the federal agency that advises Congress on Medicare issues, found that there was no analytical 
foundation for this difference.”). 
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from Medicare regarding reimbursement rates for APRN services, an increase in the Medicare 
reimbursement rate could therefore affect the insurance reimbursement rate.43  
2: Amending Medicare 
The goal to amend Medicare was introduced because, as it is currently written, Medicare 
will only allow a physician (not an APRN) to certify patients for, inter alia, home health and 
hospice care.44 This kind of care allows Medicare recipients to receive certain personal care 
services—including end of life and palliative care—at home, rather than in an extended-stay 
hospital or nursing home.45 Approximately 33% of Medicare beneficiaries experienced some kind 
of adverse effect as a result of a stay at a skilled nursing home.46 Furthermore, the vast majority of 
seniors favor granting more access for the elderly and infirm to at-home care.47 Giving APRNs the 
ability to certify this type of care would improve access and expediency for this service.48 Again, 
though, Congress has failed to act in this regard. 
 
 
3: Reimbursement 
                                                 
43 Lorraine Bock, Changing Reimbursement Policies, ADVANCE HEALTHCARE NETWORK FOR NPS AND PAS, 
http://nurse-practitioners-and-physician-assistants.advanceweb.com/Article/Changing-Reimbursement-Policies.aspx 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2015); see also 42 USCS § 1395b-6 (LEXIS 2015)(establishing the Medicare Payment 
Advisory Commission, which advises Congress on payment policies under Medicare).  
44 42 USCS § 1395f (LEXIS 2015); see also http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/02/27/how-
obamacare-is-ramping-up-a-health-care-turf-war/. 
45Andrea Brassard, Removing Barriers to Advanced Practice Registered Nurse Care: Home Health and Hospice 
Services, 66 INSIGHT ON THE ISSUES 1, 2 (Jul. 2012) available at 
http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/public_policy_institute/health/removing-barriers-advanced-practice-
registered-nurse-home-health-hospice-insight-july-2012-AARP-ppi-health.pdf. 
46 Adverse Events in Skilled Nursing Facilities: National Incidence Among Medicare Beneficiaries, DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL 1, 17-22 (2014), 
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-11-00370.pdf. 
47Brassard, supra note 45, at 4. 
48 Id. 
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The third IOM recommendation called for extending to APRNs the ACA reimbursement 
for primary care physicians. The provision in question increased mandatory Medicaid rates paid 
to certain primary care physicians to equal the rates paid by Medicare for the same services.49 This 
provision expired in 2014, however, after an extension failed to escape committee in the 
Republican-controlled Congress.50 This recommendation was essentially no different from other 
reimbursement equity provisions envisioned by the Report, except that its acceptance could have 
theoretically increased health care access into underserved areas. Many of the underserved receive 
their health care from Medicaid-funded community health centers.51 Those health centers 
receiving the benefit of Medicaid expansion granted by the ACA saw an increase in staff in all 
areas except NPs, even though NPs account for a large portion of the providers in such facilities.52  
Additionally, given the ACA’s use of the word “clinicians” rather than “physicians” in 
much of its language, there seems to be a presumption in favor of diversified healthcare 
practitioners.53 Furthermore, the provision for Centers of Medicare and Medicaid Innovation 
(CMMI) have presumably left the door open for the inclusion of APRNs in future projects, once 
the second round of funding for those projects comes around.54  
4: Limiting Federal Funding to Consensus Model States 
                                                 
49 DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICAID PROGRAM; 
PAYMENTS FOR SERVICES FURNISHED BY CERTAIN PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS AND CHARGES FOR VACCINE 
ADMINISTRATION UNDER THE VACCINES FOR CHILDREN PROGRAM 1, 3 (2009), 
http://www.beckersasc.com/docs/oldmedia/CMSFinalRulePCPMedicaid.pdf. 
50 Pear, supra note 38. 
51 THE KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID AND COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTERS: THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COVERAGE FOR ADULTS AND PRIMARY CARE CAPACITY IN MEDICALLY UNDERSERVED 
COMMUNITIES 1, 2 (KAISER 2013), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8293.pdf. 
52 Id. 
53 Jansen, supra note 17, at 90.  
54 Id., The CMMI is program within the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) created by the ACA, 
which allows more freedom for CMS to experiment with new and innovative approaches to healthcare. Innovations 
provided for in the legislation include, inter alia, insurance exchanges for those not covered by government or third 
party insurance programs, a Medicare accountable care organization pilot program, and a program to provide 
funding for the transitional care of patients being discharged from hospitals. The funding for these programs is not 
necessarily limited to only physicians. 
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The fourth recommendation—limiting federal funding [for what] to those states that have 
adopted the NCBSN Consensus Model—is arguably the most effective tool to wrangle the States 
into uniformity on the issue of APRN scope of practice.  
a: The Consensus Model 
The Consensus Model is the product of approximately 4 years of discussion between 23 
nursing organizations and the National Council of State Boards of Nursing (NCSBN).55 The 
NCBSN is an independent, not-for-profit association through which state boards of nursing act to 
standardize certain practices affecting nursing professions.56 The NCBSN coalesced with these 
other nursing organizations to form the consensus model in order to rein in the chaotic nature of 
APRN regulation and implement a stable and systematic expression of the designation, finally 
bringing together a coherent system that covers licensure, accreditation, certification, and 
education (LACE).57 The Model Act (for the practice of nursing) and Model Rules emerged from 
this effort.58 As states implement the consensus model, state regulation nationwide will move 
closer to uniformity in scope of practice regulation.59 Withholding federal funding for nursing 
education from those states that do not conform to the consensus model could be a very effective 
stick in creating state consensus; however, there is no sign at all of congressional action in this 
area. 
 
 
5: Spurring Action 
                                                 
55 Id., at 57. 
56 NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE BOARDS OF NURSING, https://www.ncsbn.org (last visited Mar. 19, 2015). 
57 Jansen, supra note 17, at 59. 
58 NCSBN CONSENSUS MODEL, supra note 6.  
59 NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE BOARDS OF NURSING, https://www.ncsbn.org/5397.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2015) 
(map showing the current landscape of implementation). 
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This leads to the question of what exactly is needed to spur Congressional action to meet 
the IOM goals. Health care is currently a huge source of contention in Congress, but nursing itself 
can be a bi-partisan issue. A brief overview of the regions allowing expansive scope of practice 
compared with stricter jurisdictions shows, that while the traditionally “red” southeast region is en 
masse the most restrictive region, traditionally “blue” stronghold states like New York, New 
Jersey, and California are also restrictive.60 On the other hand, the Southeast (besides California) 
and the Northwest grant the most uniformly expansive scope of practice rights.61 The inference, 
given the demographics, is that the more rural states of the country (again, discounting the 
Southeast) are the most open to expansive scope of practice. It would be preposterous to propose 
that APRNs are simply more qualified to deliver medical care in rural areas than in urban ones; 
therefore, the only deciding factor seems to be that more populous states have some reason other 
than medical skill to limit APRN scope of nursing. The implication is antitrust, which will be 
discussed infra. In the meantime, the implication for Congressional action is that the matter is of 
bipartisan concern, and could probably be addressed without major partisan rancor, given enough 
interest. Perhaps it could even be addressed in legislation amending the ACA. Of course, the great 
disparity between the amounts of lobbying money contributed by the American Nurses 
Association ($1,467,064 in 2014) versus the amount contributed by the AMA ($19,650,000 in 
2014) may help to explain the reluctance of Congress to address the issue.62 
 
 
                                                 
60 BARTON ASSOCIATES, http://www.bartonassociates.com/nurse-practitioners/nurse-practitioner-scope-of-practice-
laws/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2015) (interactive graphic representing various scope of practice laws in U.S.). 
61 Id. 
62 OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?cycle=2014&id=D000000173 (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2015); Id., at http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000000068 (last visited Mar. 19, 
2015). 
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B: Recommendations for the States 
The IOM report recommends that state legislatures (1) Reform scope of practice 
regulations to conform to the NCBSM model Act and Rules; and (2) “Require third-party payers 
that participate in fee-for-service payment arrangements to provide direct reimbursement to 
[APRNs] who are practicing within their scope of practice under state law.”63 This means that 
private insurance companies would have to reimburse APRNs directly for specific services if those 
services fall within a state’s scope of practice for APRNs, rather than requiring a collaborative 
agreement with a physician.  
1: Reforming Scope of Practice Laws 
a: Collaborative Agreements 
A collaborative agreement is a metaphorical tether, binding APRNs to a supervising 
physician.64 A typical collaborative agreement, such as the kind required in New Jersey, require 
the APRN and physician to establish joint protocols for the treatment of patients, and the 
immediate presence or electronic availability of the collaborating physician.65 The more onerous 
of such statutes requiring agreements, like Missouri’s contain stringent geographic proximity 
requirements and bi-monthly review of patient charts.66 The main issue with such agreements is 
that they potentially limit the services for and area in which an APRN can provide care, thus 
limiting consumers’ access, and limiting the APRN unnecessarily from full use of his or her 
training.67  
b: Regulatory Structure 
                                                 
63 IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra at S-8.  
64 CITIZEN ADVOCACY CTR., SCOPE OF PRACTICE FAQS FOR CONSUMERS, ADVANCED PRACTICE REGISTERED 
NURSES 1, 2, http://www.nacns.org/docs/toolkit/3A-FAQScope.pdf. 
65 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:11-49 (LEXIS 2015); N.J. ADMIN. CODE 13:35-6.6 (LEXIS 2015) (regulates the standards 
for joint protocols). 
66 MO. REV. STAT. § 334.104 (LEXIS 2015). 
67 CITIZEN ADVOCACY CTR., supra note 64, at 2. 
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State statutes, along with regulations promulgated by state nursing boards, regulate nursing 
practice and scope.68 In addition, states have medical practice acts that may affect nursing scope 
of practice by prohibiting the practice of medicine by all but medical doctors.69 These can lead to 
murky territory, in which the exact scope of practice for APRNs is not fully delineated.70 It is 
therefore the province of state legislatures to enact reforms to scope of practice laws. 
Consequently, it is in state legislatures where most of the battles are fought. The ultimate goal of 
such legislation is to achieve full scope of practice for APRNs, including prescriptive privileges, 
independent of collaborative agreements.71 
c: The Consensus Model for State Regulation 
The NCBSN tracks how compliant the states are with the Consensus Model.72 There are 
11 states and 1 territory with a perfect NCSBN score for compliance.73 Iowa practically achieved 
a perfect score, since the only requirement not met is the actual “APRN” title (Iowa’s designation 
is “Advanced Registered Nurse Practitioner” or “ARNP).74 However, the moniker “APRN” has 
some legal significance for those practitioners who work across state lines.75 A perfect score means 
that the state/territory has adopted all 4 APRN titles and roles (CNP, CRNA, CNM, CNS, though 
some names may vary superficially), licensing, education, and certification requirements, and 
perhaps most relevant to the immediate discussion, allows independent practice and independent 
                                                 
68 Karla Kelly, Nurse Practitioner Challenges to the Orthodox Structure of Health Care Delivery: Regulation and 
Restraints on Trade, 11 AM. J. OF L. & MED. 195, 199 (1985). 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE BOARDS OF NURSING, https://www.ncsbn.org/738.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2015). 
72 See NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE BOARDS OF NURSING, supra, note 59. 
73 Id. 
74 Iowa Board of Nursing, The Advanced Registered Nurse Practitioner, IOWA.GOV, 
http://nursing.iowa.gov/nursing_practice/arnp.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2015).  
75 Jansen, supra note 17, at 327. (“Lack of uniform titling provided several disadvantages to APRNs who are 
required to use state-protected titles in business communications, particularly when practice is located across state 
lines”). 
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prescribing without written collaboration agreements.76 A poor score means that the state has not 
adopted the nomenclature, and does not allow independent practice. Among the lowest scoring 
states are New Jersey, Michigan, Florida, and Alabama.77 In between are states that, inter alia, 
allow independent practice but not independent prescriptive rights (Wisconsin), or fully meet all 
licensing and title specifications but allow no independence (Texas), or give expanded rights to 
some APRNs, but not others (North Carolina).78 
i: New Jersey Scope of Practice Reform 
New Jersey’s main sponsor of a bill eliminating collaborative agreements cites to a rural 
New Jersey APRN who was the primary provider for “thousands of patients,” who had to stop 
providing care when her supervising physician retired.79 Introduced in 2012 by Assemblywoman 
Munoz, the New Jersey Consumer Access to Healthcare Act would bring sweeping change to New 
Jersey scope of practice for APRNs.80 Specifically, it would entirely eliminate the need for any 
collaborative agreement between any APRN (all roles) and a physician, and it would also allow 
full prescriptive privileges for qualifying APRNs.81 This would bring New Jersey up to almost 
complete compliance with the Model Rules; the only non-compliant portion is that the proposed 
act continues to refer to the subject as Advanced Practice Nurses (APN), rather than APRN.82  
The Executive Committee of the New Jersey Board of Medical Examiners opposed the 
Senate version of the Bill, expressing its opposition based upon 3 main concerns: that under certain 
circumstances a physician should be brought in to give treatment, and the Bill erodes those 
                                                 
76 NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE BOARDS OF NURSING, Major Components of the Consensus Model by State (2014), 
https://www.ncsbn.org/2014.07_18_Julymapwithpoints.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2015). 
77 NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE BOARDS OF NURSING, supra, note 59. 
78 NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE BOARDS OF NURSING, supra, note 76. 
79 Lisette Hilton, New York/New Jersey legislation could test APN 'tether', NURSE.COM (Jun. 3, 2013), 
http://news.nurse.com/article/20130603/NY01/106030005#.VGFKb_TF-EM.  
80 A.B. 906, 216th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2014).  
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
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circumstances; that the Bill could result in raised medical malpractice insurance premiums for 
physicians; and that consumers should be advised as to who (actual role of the practitioner and her 
education and title) is actually providing health care.83 As to the first complaint, there is no rational 
explanation as to why a physician could not be brought in if needed, even under the new language 
of the Act.84 The Act does not command APRNs to never contact a physician; it simply seeks to 
expand the scope of practice to the extent of training. It should also be noted that even physicians 
have a duty to refer patients whose care exceeds their competence, and face malpractice suits if 
they fail in that duty; there is therefore no reason that APRNs should not face the same liability.85 
Regarding the second objection, there does not appear to be evidence that relaxed licensing 
laws cause malpractice premiums to increase. According to the National Bureau of Economic 
Research, for example, while restrictive scope of practice laws tend to lead to greater health care 
costs, more liberal laws lead to no change in malpractice premiums.86 Other sources show similar 
results.87 However, this is an evolving area of the law, and its scope cannot be covered in this Note. 
As to the objection that the public would not be adequately advised as to who provides 
their health care, that objection essentially tracks the AMA’s “Truth in Advertising” campaign.88 
That campaign ostensibly seeks to keep health care consumers informed about who is providing 
                                                 
83 Open Board Agenda, New Jersey Board of Medical Examiners (Jan. 13, 2013), 
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/ca/bme/agenda/bmeage_010913.pdf.  
84 David Gorsky, Expanding the scope of practice of advanced practice nurses will not endanger patients, SCIENCE-
BASED MEDICINE (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.sciencebasedmedicine.org/expanding-the-scope-of-practice-of-
advanced-practice-nurses-does-not-endanger-patients/ (“What happens when a physician encounters something in 
the course of diagnosis or treatment that goes very wrong and he doesn’t have the training to handle? He calls in 
other physicians who can handle it”). 
85 Tine Hansen-Turton, Jamie Ware & Frank McClellan, Nurse Practitioners in Primary Care, 82 TEMP. L. 
REV. 1235, 1251 (2010). 
86 MORRIS M. KLEINER ET AL., RELAXING OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING REQUIREMENTS: ANALYZING WAGES AND 
PRICES FOR A MEDICAL SERVICE, NBER WORKING PAPER NO. 19906, 1, 5 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research 2014), 
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87 MICHIGAN COUNCIL OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS, APRN SCOPE OF PRACTICE: ACCESS TO CARE AND MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE, http://www.micnp.org/files/Comparison%20of%20other%20states%20sheet.pdf. 
88 AMA ADVOCACY RES. CTR., “TRUTH IN ADVERTISING” CAMPAIGN 1, 2 (AM. MED. 2012). 
19 
 
their health care, but could effectively work to punish nurses who may legitimately lay claim to 
the title “Doctor,” such as APRNs who also have achieved a doctorate degree.89 While patients 
have a legitimate concern in knowing their provider’s qualifications, the proposed legislation in 
that campaign is largely duplicative of current state legislation which already protects patients 
from fraudulent representation of credentials, and it seeks to treat clinicians unequally, applying 
standards to nurses that are not applied to physicians.90 
ii: Other States’ Efforts 
The continuing objections in other states echo the same themes as New Jersey. The 
Michigan State Medical Society calls its state scope of nursing practice proposal “unproven and 
controversial.”91 While it is controversial (because medical societies keep objecting to it), it is 
obviously not unproven, given the breadth of similar laws already enacted.92 Florida’s bill 
proposing expansion allows APRNs (in Florida, ARNPs) to practice independently, and to 
prescribe controlled substances and narcotics, leading the Florida Medical Association to insinuate 
Florida would “move backwards” in its fight to curb prescription medicine abuse.93 The 
Association cited no study supporting the insinuation that expansion would lead to prescription 
drug abuse, nor is the contention supported elsewhere.94 That bill subsequently died in 
committee.95 The Massachusetts Medical Society also toes the line set by the AMA, “arguing 
[expanded scope of practice] was contrary to an optimal physician-led, team-based health care 
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delivery model and was a possible threat to patient safety.”96 Once again, no referral is made to 
any study revealing a possible threat.97 
The point is that while legislation on the issue is active in many states, states’ medical 
societies oppose expanded scope of practice.98 And most of those medical societies have 
significant lobbying influence.99 Consequently, much of the scope of practice legislation on the 
slate for 2014 died, either in committee, or was voted down, or vetoed.100 Expanded scope of 
practice is getting heard in the states, but the opposition, coming almost solely from physicians’ 
groups, is as fierce as it is unfounded in science. 
d: An Emerging Strategy 
Perhaps the best strategy for APRN advocates, though, is a piecemeal strategy. The laws 
getting struck down are largely laws that propose sweeping legislation that immediately conforms 
to the Model Act.101 In addition to his statement about conferring with his chief medical officer, 
the Nebraska Governor spoke of his willingness to enact smaller changes.102 What may find 
success is tying independence to some sort of clinical experience regime, perhaps which will 
eventually be understood as a residency or equivalent. For example, as previously stated, 
successful scope of practice expansion has been achieved when the legislation requires nurses to 
                                                 
96 Statehouse Update: Practice Expansion for APNs Rejected, MASSACHUSETTS MED. SOC., (Aug., 2014)  
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have a certain threshold of clinical experience within a collaborative agreement scheme before 
they may be un-tethered, and strike out on their own.103 It has been observed that law passage is 
biased in some states toward incremental, rather than comprehensive change, and adding mandated 
hours of clinical experience may be the middle ground that ushers in more successful legislation.104 
2: Reimbursement from 3rd Party Payers 
Finally, the IOM report recommends that states require 3rd party payers to pay direct 
reimbursement to APRNs.105 This provision was added because “few if any third-party payers 
recognize nursing services that aren't bundled with medical management and, therefore, nursing 
services are not directly reimbursed.”106 In short, nurses can’t get paid unless a physician who does 
the billing on their behalf is supervising them.  As such, APRNs received reimbursement 
“indirectly, incident to physicians, and at a considerably lower rate.”107 Such reimbursement 
schemes create a de facto tether to physicians. Independence issues aside, the outcomes for patients 
tend to improve with intervention from nurses, and without an accounting mechanism for nurse 
intervention that direct reimbursement could supply, valuable care may be lost.108  
Private third party insurers are regulated by the individual states.109 Federal mandates that 
typically govern third party reimbursement in the realm of Medicare and Medicaid are often 
blocked by discriminatory rules and regulations regarding “non-physician” and “mid-level” 
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providers.110 Thus, there is an arbitrary reimbursement system in place which discriminates against 
APRNs, without regard for patient outcomes. Of course, this proposition calls forth the 
philosophical question of whether providers are paid for the quality of their outcomes, or the 
quality, quantity and cost of their educations; to wit: should a physician receive more 
reimbursement for her treatment of strep throat than a nurse practitioner for the exact same 
treatment, because the physician presumably has the greater education? Under a fee-for-service 
regime, does supposed expertise have a bearing on outcomes? Regardless of these more esoteric 
considerations, the point of the IOM recommendation is, presumably, to pay people directly for 
the health care they actually can provide, rather than filter that payment through unnecessary 
middlemen. 
Part IV: Physician Opposition and Antitrust 
A: Physician Opposition 
The main opposition to expanded scope of practice comes from contentions by physicians 
that APRNs do not receive adequate training to be entrusted with the full scope of that training. 
The AMA listed the disparity in clinical experience between doctors and nurses as its main 
opposition to the IOM report.111 In 2014, New York State passed legislation expanding practice 
for registered nurse practitioners.112 One vocal opponent of that legislation cited the AMA 
verbatim in his scathing criticism of the new law.113 He further cited to a 1999 study suggesting 
that NPs may resort to more diagnostic tests, thus negating any economic benefits.114 However, no 
opposing party has actually cited to any research supporting the contention that APRNs provide 
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inferior care; in fact, studies tend to show the opposite. Specifically, a systematic review compiling 
nearly two decades of research found that “care delivered by APRNs and care delivered by 
physicians (alone or in teams without an APRN) produce equivalent patient outcomes.”115  Of 
course, this study focuses on the kinds of patients whom APRNs and physicians are qualified to 
treat in common; there are many high risk or severely compromised patients whom APRNs do not 
treat. 
1: The Objective Evidence 
The 2011 study, a meta-analysis examining 29 separate patient outcomes (as opposed to 
patient preferences) from a total of 69 studies conducted over 18 years, demonstrated that in no 
category did patients experience more adverse outcomes under the care of APRNs than under that 
of physicians.116 In fact, APRNs’ patients presented more favorable outcomes in certain 
categories.117 In a 2012 report critical of expanded scope of practice legislation, the Physicians 
Foundation—whose mission is to oppose expansion of non-physicians’ scope of practice—
acknowledged that “the research literature shows, without exception, that within their areas of 
training and experience, nurse practitioners provide care that is as good as or better than that 
provided by physicians.”118 The report goes on to question the validity of one of those studies, 
which it claims—without substantiation—is the definitive study on the topic, and fails to even 
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mention the above 2011 study.119 The report suggests bias, observing without more that APRN 
advocates performed much of the research in the area.120  
The conflict of interest criticism asserted by the Physicians Foundation is ultimately 
disingenuous. A 1986 policy analysis submitted to Congress by the now-defunct Office of 
Technology Assessment (OTA) found that “the weight of the evidence indicates that, within their 
areas of competence, NPs… and CNMs provide care whose quality is equivalent to that of care 
provided by physicians.”121 The OTA was committed to providing objective and non-partisan 
information to Congress; it was not prone to a pro-APRN bias.122 While that report is nearly 30 
years old, no physicians’ groups have put forward subsequent research to refute it, and it has been 
substantially upheld by subsequent studies. While at the end of the day this report does not include 
the most recent areas of practice, taken with the 2011 study, and the acknowledgement of the 
Physicians Foundation that all empirical evidence points inexorably to the fact of equivalent 
patient outcomes, and lacking any evidence to the contrary, physicians appear to base their 
opposition not upon an objective scientific standard, but merely upon their own unsubstantiated 
prejudices. Of course, it is quite possible that physicians view expanded scope of practice as a 
competitive threat to their business; if that is the case, then the issue demands antitrust analysis. 
B: Antitrust 
Antitrust, for our purposes, is about the competitive effects of certain types of conduct that 
potentially, adversely affect the price, quality, and availability of a product—in this case health 
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care—thereby impinging upon the welfare of consumers.123 Physicians and APRNs are 
competitors, not because they offer the exact same services to the same populations, but because 
their services are potential substitutes.124 This is not to say that APRNs should replace physicians, 
nor that the competitors should not also collaborate, or even work for each other.125 The purpose 
of this Note is certainly not to ignore any issues of public safety. Rather, all other factors being 
equal, this antitrust analysis seeks to expose harm to the consumer resulting from anticompetitive 
behavior which, but for under-rationalized or arbitrary regulations put in place by one interested 
competitor and sanctioned by governments, would not occur. 
The IOM report speaks directly to matters of antitrust, where it urges the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) and Antitrust Division of the Federal Government Department of Justice to 
review current legislation and laws in the states for possible anticompetitive effects.126 
Furthermore, antitrust issues arise when one particular coalition of professionals gathers in order 
to undermine a competing coalition’s ability to compete. In this case, the American Medical 
Association and the assorted State medical societies/associations make up coalitions, though their 
efforts may not reach the level of antitrust; or if they do, the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine may 
protect those actions. Regarding legislation, the FTC has had a hand in guiding state legislatures 
away from passing anti-competitive laws.127 The “advocacy” function of the FTC may prove to be 
exceedingly influential, and it has certainly taken up the call directed to it by the IOM.128 The 
remainder of this note will focus briefly on the FTC’s role in antitrust action, and move into 
discussions of the Sherman Act generally, as well as the Noerr-Pennington and State Action 
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Doctrines, which are the primary limitations to antitrust action, and finally a discussion regarding 
N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC,129 a case recently decided by the Supreme Court, 
which bears on the issue. 
1: The FTC 
Regulatory restrictions on APRN scope of practice have drawn attention from the FTC’s 
competition advocacy program.130 The FTC’s interest in the issue is drawn from the FTC Act itself, 
which “prohibits ‘[u]nfair methods of competition’ and ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices,’ and 
gives the FTC  a mandate ‘to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations’ from engaging in such 
prohibited methods, acts, and practices.131 In the health care arena, the FTC has “investigated 
restrictions on the business practices of health care providers, scrutinized proposed mergers, and 
brought enforcement actions against health care providers that have violated federal competition 
law.”132 The Commission has been enhanced by congressional legislation, such that “[e]conomic 
and policy research and competition advocacy thus are at the core of the FTC's statutory mission, 
alongside the Commission's civil law enforcement responsibilities.”133 
The result is an FTC that may influence and enforce policy. Substantial challenges exist to 
enforcing competition through litigation, such that the FTC cannot always act as a litigious sword 
in the hands of regulators, but must instead sometimes work more passively, through legislatures 
and legislators, in order to promote competition policy at a formative level. The FTC’s role in this 
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context has been discussed comprehensively elsewhere, and will not be further discussed at length 
here.134 
2: The Sherman Act §1, Generally 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes illegal, and criminalizes contracts or conspiracies in 
restraint of trade.135 A section one claimant must initially prove three elements: (1) an agreement 
or conspiracy between at least two persons or distinct business entities; (2) to harm or restrain 
competition; and (3) which actually injures competition.136 Opposition to expanding the scope of 
APRNs’ practice seems like a deceptively simple, per se instance of restraint of trade by the AMA 
and other medical societies, or state boards of medicine: (1) Physicians make up such societies or 
boards, and are persons or distinct business entities within the meaning of the statute, and have 
obviously agreed to work together in this regard.137 (2) Their agreement is to advocate for policies, 
which work to the detriment of APRN competition with them. (3) This harms consumers, since 
without the ability to practice to the extent of their scope, APRNs cannot offer their services, even 
when those services match those of competing physicians. Antitrust may be unavailing in this 
context, though, because of two doctrines: the State Action Doctrine and the Noerr-Pennington 
Doctrine. 
3: The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine 
Briefly, the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine protects the First Amendment Right of citizens, 
including trade groups, to earnestly petition the government to adopt a particular course of action, 
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“no matter how anticompetitive the action sought.”138 Its reach is sweeping, covering all three 
branches of government, as well as administrative agencies.139 In Eastern Railroad Conference v. 
Noerr Motor Freight,140 the case from which the doctrine takes its name, “railroads were genuinely 
lobbying the legislature for laws that would favor them at the expense of their competitors,” which 
given the First Amendment right to petition and our common understanding of representative 
government is a fairly intuitive right to afford protection.”141 United Mine Workers of America v. 
Pennington142 was a similarly intuitive case, extending Noerr immunity to petitions of the 
Executive.143 Finally, California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited144 extended Noerr-
Pennington immunity to entities interacting with the courts and administrative agencies, but 
applied the “sham” exception for the first time.145 The “sham” exception stands for the principle 
that “when efforts to influence government action are considered ‘sham,’ the petition is stripped 
of its immunity.”146 In other words, immunity is lost when advocacy efforts are an obvious charade, 
not pursued in good faith, but rather pursued as a means to obfuscate otherwise prohibited 
intentions. 
 
 
a: The Sham Exception 
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Observed in the light of the sham exception, physicians’ organizations’ efforts to petition 
the legislature against APRN scope of practice are suspect. Assuming that physicians’ societies 
and boards deserve the benefit of the doubt regarding their good faith belief that APRNs are 
insufficiently trained or competent to practice independently, one might think that they are being 
deliberately obtuse with regard to the objective research on APRN outcomes. However, the 
Supreme Court has eviscerated the sham exception to the point that it is essentially worthless in 
this context, even when Noerr-Pennington immunity stands to severely injure consumers.147 
In a legislative context, sham as an exception to Noerr-Pennington is entirely useless, even 
if it involves fraud or misrepresentation.148 Even if, hypothetically, interest groups petitioning 
legislatures do so in bad faith, and use entirely false data to support their positions, Noerr-
Pennington is an absolute shield against antitrust liability. There is simply no chance to pursue 
antitrust litigation in this context, nor is this Note meant to propose changes to the doctrine. 
Nonetheless, the sham exception remains robust in the context of litigation or 
administrative processes.149 Unfortunately, how this may apply to the immediate matter is unclear. 
The AMA and other such organizations are not bringing lawsuits against APRNs to enjoin their 
practice; if they were, then the sham exception might apply. Instead, there are currently physicians 
serving on state medical boards, whose recommendations as to what the practice of medicine is 
become the law. As state appointees, those regulators are shielded by the state action doctrine, and 
are thus immune from antitrust action… with a new exception, recently delineated, as shall be 
discussed infra. 
3: The State Action Doctrine 
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The State Action Doctrine, in the antitrust context, reinforces the principles of federalism 
immunizing state action from antitrust challenge. Thus, a state agency may theoretically engage 
in anticompetitive behavior without the risk of antitrust action, though it should be noted that “a 
state cannot ‘give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate 
it, or by declaring that their action is lawful.’”150  
The state agencies of concern to this Note are Boards of Medicine, which define the 
scope of the practice of medicine for a state.151 Board membership typically consists of 
volunteers, ordinarily appointed by the governor, most of whom are usually physicians, though 
several non-physicians often serve as well.152 In New Jersey, for example, the enabling statute 
gives the governor appointment rights of the Board of Medical Examiners (as it is called in NJ), 
and outlines all of the responsibilities of the Board; in particular, the Board decides the scope of 
practice of medicine, and enforces that scope through the Attorney General.153 The statute 
specifically states that the “Governor shall give due consideration to, but shall not be bound by, 
recommendations submitted by the appropriate professional organizations of this State.”154 In 
other words, professional (private) organizations have a voice in gubernatorial appointments to 
the boards. While it makes sense that the governor has advice regarding who the best candidate 
shall be for the position, it still raises some flags when a professional organization has a voice in 
who gets to compete with it. Regardless, although prudent policy may call this a conflict of 
interests, the state action doctrine renders it immune to judicial scrutiny. However, Justice 
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Kennedy’s opinion in N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC recently made it a bit harder 
for state boards to engage in anti-competitive behavior.155 
4: N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC 
The pertinent facts of the case arose when the North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners 
took upon itself to investigate, and then independently issue cease and desist orders to non-
dentists engaging in the commercial business of teeth-whitening, which the Board considered to 
be the practice of dentistry.156 As Justice Kennedy later observed, while North Carolina had 
delegated control to the Board over the practice of dentistry, the relatively new practice of teeth 
whitening was not included in the empowering act as “the practice of dentistry.”157 The FTC 
charged the Board of “violating 15 U.S.C. § 45, the FTC Act, by excluding non-dentist teeth 
whiteners from the market” in violation of §1 of the Sherman Act.158 The Board petitioned the 4th 
Circuit for review, seeking application of the state action doctrine.159  
a: The 4th Circuit Decision 
First, the 4th Circuit upheld the earlier determination by the FTC, that as a “public/private 
hybrid entit[y]” the Board lacked government supervision, and was therefore a private actor.160 
In concluding that the Board was not exempt under state action, the Fourth Circuit looked 
specifically at the “Parker Doctrine,” which enumerates three situations under which an entity 
can claim immunity.161 The Board had claimed immunity under the second Parker situation—the 
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Midcal test—wherein “private parties can claim the Parker exemption if acting pursuant to a 
‘clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy’ and their behavior is ‘actively 
supervised by the State itself.’”[sic]162 Recognizing that “fundamental national values of free 
enterprise and economic competition [] are embodied in the federal antitrust laws,” the Court 
sanctioned state-action immunity “only when [] clear that the challenged anticompetitive conduct 
[was] undertaken pursuant to a regulatory scheme that [was] the State's own.”163  
The Court went on to determine that the regulatory scheme in question failed the Midcal 
test, since the Board could not show that it was actively supervised by the State.164 According to 
the 4th Circuit, the Board lacked supervision because its membership was elected exclusively by 
private actors—that is, only other dentists elected the Board, with no involvement of the 
Governor, nor any other elected official.165 This was sufficient for the FTC—and subsequently 
the Fourth Circuit—to hold that the board was a private entity, even though it was created 
through an act of the State. However, while the concurring gloss from the 4th Circuit stressed that 
the ruling was narrow, and that had the Board been chosen by elected officials, Midcal would 
have been satisfied, the Supreme Court’s recent decision has broadened the ruling remarkably.166 
 
 
b: The Supreme Court’s Decision 
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In affirming the 4th Circuit, Justice Kennedy stressed that, in order to gain Parker 
immunity, it is necessary that a state agency prove “more than a mere façade of state 
involvement”; specifically, that “[the] States accept political accountability for anticompetitive 
conduct they permit and control.”167 The Court recognized that the private concerns of active 
market participants, when those participants serve on state agencies, pose a danger to consumers 
if private actors work to further their own interests, rather than those of the state.168 Therefore, 
the government must seek assurance that those private actors are in fact pursuing the state’s 
interests in addition to their own.169 The Court went on to hold that state boards controlled by 
active participants in the market which the board regulates must satisfy the active market 
participation test of Midcal in order to enjoy Parker immunity. 
The Court introduced a test for “active supervision” that would satisfy Midcal.170 As a 
general proposition, such an inquiry is “flexible and context-dependent.”171 Supervision “need 
not entail day-to-day involvement in an agency’s operations,” but must probe “whether the 
State’s review mechanisms provide ‘realistic assurance’ that a nonsovereign actor’s 
anticompetitive conduct ‘promotes state policy, rather than merely the party’s individual 
interests.’”172 The Court identified four specific requirements of state supervision: first, the state 
supervisor must review the substance of an anticompetitive board decision, not simply whether it 
was procedurally proper; second, the supervisor must have veto power over, and power to 
modify, the decision; third, the supervisor must be an active participant in the decision, rather 
than simply having the potential to intervene; fourth, the supervisor may not itself be an active 
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market participant. 173 The Court then iterated that further analysis would rely upon context and 
the specific circumstances of the case.174 
i: Implications of Dental Examiners 
While the Court’s decision in the case has not completely opened the door for APRNs to 
unilaterally expand scope of practice, it has limited the ability of state boards to act in an anti-
competitive manner without the mandate of the state. The Dental Board was charged by the FTC 
when the Board unilaterally sought to enforce the Board’s own definition of the practice of 
dentistry; a definition that was not statutorily enunciated because, as Justice Kennedy observed, 
the statute did not include “teeth whitening” in the definition.175 The Board’s violation of 
antitrust law was specifically their unsupervised action taken against competitors. If the Board 
had written the cease and desist letters under proper supervision, then the FTC would have had 
no case. Accordingly, state boards of medicine may not take such uncompetitive, unilateral 
action with regard to those they judge to exceed the scope of practice. But if such action is 
currently being taken, it is not immediately apparent. 
The decision should force states to reexamine their current oversight of professional 
boards. While states probably have sufficient process to cover the Court’s active supervision test 
under their Administrative Procedure Acts, it is obvious, given the facts of Dental Examiners, 
that there are some actions of state boards that may have otherwise been overlooked.176 In New 
Jersey, for example, state boards are vested with investigative powers.177 While state licensing 
boards must exercise these investigative powers through the attorney general, that process must 
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be examined in light of the Dental Examiners test to ensure proper oversight.178 The New Jersey 
Board of Medical Examiners certainly falls under the auspices of Dental Examiners, since the 
Board is comprised of at least 16 MDs and/or DOs (Doctors of Osteopathy), all of who should be 
considered active market participants.179 Furthermore, the Board is given the power to subpoena 
witnesses to appear before the Board.180 It is not absurd to think that the Board could use this 
power in an intimidating, anti-competitive manner, just as the North Carolina Dental Board used 
cease and desist letters.  
Ultimately, Dental Examiners calls for sufficient oversight of specific actions taken by 
State Boards. I do not contend that it reaches those medical societies and advocates covered by 
the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, nor do I propose that it can erode legislation or regulations duly 
enacted by elected state actors. The decision affects actions of Boards acting in an anti-
competitive manner, when they have not been specifically empowered so to do. If the New 
Jersey Board of Medical Examiners decided tomorrow to start sending letters to nurse 
practitioners demanding that they cease and desist treating patients, even when they are doing so 
under a state-approved collaboration scheme with a physician, then that would definitely fall 
under the kind of behavior prohibited by Dental Examiners.  
I do not think one could successfully argue that Dental Examiners affects scope of 
practice statutes, since those are passed specifically by the legislature. Legislation of this kind is 
necessarily exempt from federal antitrust action due to the state action doctrine. State Boards of 
Medicine do not themselves create and pass scope of practice laws, and to the extent that they 
regulate the practice of medicine, those regulations must pass scrutiny by the legislature, thus 
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satisfying the active supervision requirement.181 Only if it could be shown that a state board had 
such autonomy as to pass scope of practice regulations without meaningful review from the 
legislature could Dental Examiners overturn such legislation. 
Part V: Conclusion 
The facts favoring the expansion of the scope of practice for Advanced Practice 
Registered Nurses is compelling, and momentum is entirely in favor of expansion. The ball is in 
the courts of the legislatures, however, and though change may occur incrementally, it continues 
to roll in favor of expansion. Although Dental Examiners may prove a strong tool for antitrust 
litigants against specific anti-competitive actions taken by state boards of medicine, it is limited 
to those circumstances when boards actually take such action themselves, and should not affect 
scope of practice legislation. Since Noerr-Pennington allows any sort of misrepresentation to be 
made in support of the prospect that physicians only will be the gatekeepers to public health, the 
legislatures should allow themselves to be guided not by the campaign contributions of 
physicians’ organizations, but by the social contributions of the nurses and their advocates.  
The ultimate point of Dental Examiners, and the point of scope of practice legislation, is 
that legislatures, not private actors, should decide what is best for the public welfare. This is not 
to say that legislators are themselves all experts in the fields of medicine or nursing. Legislators 
are experts in the field of governing, and are entrusted with the just governance of the people, 
and with their welfare. They are also accountable to those people, which is why they are so 
entrusted. The Noerr-Pennington and state action doctrines represent the recognition that 
legislators must be free to govern as they see fit. I do not argue against that proposition, or those 
doctrines. It is apparent that the decision of what the proper scope of practice for APRNs is lies 
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in the hands of legislators, not physicians or nurses. I only argue that such a decision must be 
properly informed by objective study and careful consideration, by the opinions of both 
physicians and nurses, and by the concern for the overall health and welfare of state populations, 
not by concern for the pocketbooks of physicians. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
